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Moore: Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse Charter School C

BEA UFOR T CO UNTY BOARD OF EDUCA TION V.
LIGHTHOUSE CHARTER SCHOOL COMMITTEE:
RACIAL BALANCING PROVISION IN SOUTH
CAROLINA CHARTER SCHOOLS ACT FLUNKS
THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since its enactment, South Carolina's Charter Schools Act of 1996 has
frequently been criticized for its racial balancing requirement.2 The balancing
requirement dictates that "under no circumstances may a charter school
enrollment differ from the racial composition of the school district by more
than ten percent." 3 In Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse
CharterSchool Committee4 the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
Beaufort Board's denial of Lighthouse's charter school application for failure
to conform to several requirements of the Act, but remanded the case for a
ruling on the constitutionality of the racial balancing requirement. 5 In light of
case law, including two recent decisions from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,6 the constitutionality of the racial balancing
requirement, which must be examined under strict scrutiny, is called into doubt
under the Equal Protection Clause.

1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-40-10 to -190 (West Supp. 1999).
2. See, e.g., CharterSchool Law DrawsFire: State Attorney GeneralSays RacialQuota
Set, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 8, 1997, at B3; CharterSchools Stalled Until State Law
Revised, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Sep. 16, 1997, atA8; Jason Davis, S.C.'s CharterSchool
Movement DraggedDown by Raciallssues,THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 17,1997, atA13;
Edward T. McMullen, Quota Laws Keep CharterSchoolsfrom Offering Children Opportunity,
THESTATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 24, 1998, atA15; Lori D. Roberts, Changesin CharterSchool
LawSuggested,THESTATE (Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 1, 1999, atB6; WhattoDo ifWe Really Want
CharterSchools, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 2, 1999, at A10; Why Close a Charter
School Before it Opens?, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 29, 1997, at A8.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-50(B)(6) (West Supp. 1999).
4. 335 S.C. 230, 516 S.E.2d 655 (1999).
5. Id. at 241, 516 S.E.2d at 661. As this Note was going to press, the Beaufort County
Circuit Court ruled that the racial proportionality requirement in the Charter School Act was
unconstitutional. See Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter School Committee,
No. 97-CP-7-794 (S.C. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2000) (Order declaring Charter School Act
unconstitutional). The court found the provision was not severable from the Act, and thus the
entire act was unconstitutional. Id. at 7.
6. See Eisenberg ex relEisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir.
1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Part II of this Note reviews the history and criticism of the Act and
examines a bill that would modify the racial balancing requirement. 7 Part II
also describes the facts and procedural posture of Lighthouse, as well as tracks
the development of the strict scrutiny standard of review for benign or remedial
racial classifications. Part HI analyzes the constitutionality of the Act, and Part
IV concludes that racial diversity can and should be achieved without resorting
to the unconstitutional use of racial quotas.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The South CarolinaCharterSchools Act
In 1996, the General Assembly of South Carolina enacted legislation
making South Carolina the twenty-fourth state to legislatively permit the
institution ofcharter schools. The statute defines a charter school as "a public,
nonsectarian, nonreligious, nonhome-based, nonprofit corporation forming a
school which operates within a public school district, but is accountable to the
local school board of trustees of that district, which grants its charter."9 The
goal is to "provide an opportunity for the organization and operation of
flexible, innovative, and substantially deregulated public schools as part of its
effort to reform and improve the state's educational system."" Apparently
concerned about possible negative effects, the General Assembly admonished
that it "will not allow greater flexibility and deregulation to result in
segregation of students by race, gender, ethnic background, income, disability,
or religious belief, whether in public charter schools or in public noncharter
schools."" A result of this concern was manifested in the racial balancing
requirement. 2 As suggested by the statute and construed in Lighthouse,
evidence of compliance with this and other requirements is required at the
application stage. 3

One commentator has criticized the "numerous restrictions"' 4 in South
Carolina's Act and has predicted that the hurdles would "sabotage the
possibility of market-like competition by creating high entrance costs for

7. H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2000) (amended May 4, 2000).
8. Recent Legislation, School Reform-CharterSchools-Connecticutand South Carolina
Pass CharterSchool Statutes-CoNN.GENSTAT. §§ 10-66AA-FF (1997); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 5940-10 to -190 (Law Co-op.Supp. 1996), 110 HARV.L.REv. 1651,1651 (1997) (identifying South
Carolina as the twenty-fourth state to pass such an act).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-40-40 (West Supp. 1999).
10. 1996 S.C. Acts 447.
11. Id.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-50(B)(6) (West Supp. 1999).
13. Id.at § 59-40-70(C); Beaufort County Bd. ofEduc. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm.,
335 S.C. 230, 236, 516 S.E.2d. 655, 658 (1999).
14. Recent Legislation, supranote 8,at 1651, 1652.
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charter schools."'" Indeed, by late April1998, only three charter schools had
opened in South Carolina, and the Lighthouse application had been rejected.' 6
South Carolina's Superintendent of Education, Barbara Nielson, blamed local
schoolboards' resistance to change, while school boards blamed the Act for the
small number of charter schools created.' 7 Newspaper editorials praised the
charter school movement but criticized South Carolina's restricted Act for the
small number of charter schools created.'" Also, the constitutionality of the
racial balancing requirement was called into question in opinions issued by the
South Carolina Attorney General's Office. 19 The Attorney General later
intervened in Lighthouse to test the constitutionality of the racial balancing
provision.20
An effort to reform South Carolina's Charter School Act is currently
underway. The House recently passed a bill2' that sought to eliminate the racial
balancing requirement of the Act,' add a requirement that a charter school
application "provide assurance that the school does not conflict with any school
district desegregation plan or order in effect,"' and retain the existing
requirement that a charter school "adhere to the same ... civil rights...
requirements as are applied to public schools."'24 The bill also sought to change
other aspects of the Charter Schools Act and allow students to transfer to
charter schools outside their home districts.' The primary sponsor of the bill,
Representative Bobby Harrell, has commented that "[w]e've got to provide
parents with more opportunities for their children. Charter schools are an
excellent opportunity, but we only have nine of them because our law is too
burdensome."'26
The House version of the bill was substantially amended by the Senate.
The Senate's version of the bill sought to modify the Act's existing racial
balancing enrollment requirements from ten percent to fifteen percent, allow
districts to approve charter schools that had made their best efforts to meet the
racial balancing guidelines, and insert a legislative finding "that diversity is an
15. Id. at 1654.
16. Few CharterSchools Open 2 Years After Law Passed,THEH ERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.),
Apr. 21, 1998, at 9B.
17. AlanRichard, CharterSchoolsa Choicenot Taken: S.C. PassedLawin '96,but Found
Few Takers, THE STATE (Columbia, SC), Apr. 26, 1998, at Al.
18. See supra note 2.
19. 1997 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 1997 WL 323797; 1997 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 1997 WL
255953; 1996 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 1996 WL 549569.
20. Lighthouse, 335 S.C. at 240, 516 S.E.2d. at 660.
21. H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2000) (amended May 4, 2000).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-50(B)(7) (West Supp. 1999).

23. § 59-40-60(F)(8).
24. § 59-40-50(B)(1).
25. § 59-40-145.
26. Bill Robinson, House OKs New CharterSchoolBill, THE-STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb.
17, 2000, at Al.
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educational benefit... that promotes racial tolerance, improves academic
performance, and breaks down barriers among individuals of different races." 2 7
The House recently rejected these amendments, however, and reamended the
bill to comport with the earlier House version abolishing the racial balancing
requirement all together.28 At the end of the 2000 session, the bill was in a joint
conference committee.29
B. Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse Charter School
Committee
Lighthouse Charter School Committee proposed a charter school on Hilton
Head Island that would operate year-round for eight hours per day and serve
about 400 students from Kindergarten to eighth grade.3" The Committee's
application to the Beaufort County Board of Education was denied for failure
to comply with the racial balancing requirement of South Carolina's Charter
School Act.3' Lighthouse also failed to obtain approval from the United States
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, which the Beaufort Board
found was required by the school district's 1970 desegregation agreement.32
Furthermore, the Beaufort Board concluded that Lighthouse would be a
"racially identifiable" school, thereby violating the terms of Beaufort's
desegregation agreement.33 Lighthouse appealed to the South Carolina Board
of Education which reversed the local board, finding that the health, safety, and
civil rights requirements of the Act need not be met before approval of an
application.34
The circuit court reversed the state board and held that the requirements
must be met in advance. 35 The court declined to consider Attorney General
Condon's challenge to the constitutionality of the racial requirement under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 The South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, finding that the "plain language" of
the statute "provides that denial of an application may be predicated on failure

27. H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2000) (amended April 26, 2000).
28. See H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2000) (amended May 4, 2000).
29. See id. For a discussion of recent developments surrounding the proposed Bill, see Jim
Davenport, ProgressSlow on CharterSchool Changes,THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 19,
2000, at B3; Jennifer Holland, Judge Rules CharterAct for S.C. Unconstitutional,THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), May 12, 2000, at B3; Ken Knelly, CharterRuling Sheds Light on School
Reform, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 13 2000, at B3.
30. Lighthouse, 335 S.C. at 236, 516 S.E.2d at 658.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 237, 516 S.E.2d at 659.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 236, 516 S.E.2d at 658.
35. Id.

36. Id. at 236, 241,516 S.E.2d at 658, 661.
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to comply with § 59-40-50. ''37 The court found that there was no evidence
offered to support the Beaufort board's contention that Lighthouse would be
a "racially identifiable" school. 8 It did find, however, that Lighthouse's
noncompliance with the desegregation agreement supported the finding of an
"adverse effect" on other students in the district.39 This finding was based on
the observation that "at a minimum, the school district would be required to
expend funds defending Lighthouse's non-compliance."' The "adverse effect"
constituted grounds for denial under another section of the Act.4' Citing judicial
economy, the court remanded the case for a ruling on the Equal Protection
challenge to the racial balancing requirements in section 59-40-50 so that
Lighthouse would know whether it must comply with this requirement should
it reapply.4'
C. UnitedStates Supreme CourtDecisionsand the ApplicabilityofStrict
Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution mandates that no state may deny any person "the equal
protection of the laws." 3 When a state classifies its citizens on the basis of
race, such classification is subject to judicial review under the "strict scrutiny"
standard." Under the strict scrutiny standard, a racial classification must (1)
serve a compelling government interest and (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.4 5 In the advent of affirmative action programs, recent United
States Supreme Court decisions have held that strict scrutiny also applies to
classifications designed to be "benign" or "remedial" in nature by helping
disadvantaged groups." In Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke47
the Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, found a minority admissions
program at the Medical School of the University of California at Davis
unconstitutional." The admissions program reserved sixteen out of one-

37. Id. at 236, 516 S.E.2d at 658 ("Section 59-40-70(C) specifically states that an
application may be denied if 'the application does not meet the requirements specified in § 5940-50 or 59-40-60."').
38. Id. at 240, 516 S.E.2d at 660.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-70(C) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1996).
42. Lighthouse, 335 S.C. at 241,516 S.E.2d at 661.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
45. Id.
46. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
47. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48. Id. at 320.
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Furthermore, minority

applications were reviewed by a separate committee and were not subject to the
grade point average minimum required of other applicants. ° Justice Powell
approved of the lower court's application of strict scrutiny and found that
"[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination."5 ' Justice Powell distinguished this
case from other desegregation or affirmative action cases in which past
discrimination was found.52 Four justices, however, would have applied a more
relaxed standard because they believed the admissions policy implicated no
"fundamental right ' 13 and served a remedial purpose. 4
In Wygant v. JacksonBoard ofEducation55 the Supreme Court examined
a teacher layoffpolicy.56 The policy dictated that in the event of layoffs, "at no
time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the
current percentage ofminority personnel employed at the time of the layoff."57
The policy was designed to help ease racial tension in the community and to
ensure the availability of role models for minority children.5s8 Justice Powell,
writing the plurality opinion, applied the strict scrutiny test and found that
while a remedial race-conscious policy by a public employer would be valid to
correct factually demonstrated prior de jure discrimination, it was not valid
when used to correct societal discrimination. 9 Justice Powell reasoned that

there was "no logical stopping point" for applying this policy.6" On the other
hand, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun believed:
In this case, it should not matter which test the Court applies.
What is most important, under any approach to the
constitutional analysis, is that a reviewing court genuinely
consider the circumstances of the provision at issue. The
history... demonstrate[s] that this provision would pass
constitutional 1muster, no matter which standard the Court
6
should adopt.

49. Id. at 275.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 291.
52. Id. at 300-01.
53. Id. at 357 (Brennan, Marshall, White, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 359

55. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 270, 272.
Id. at 276
Id. at 275.
Id. at 303 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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In a lone dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens also advocated a case-by-case
approach and did not suggest a clear standard of review.62 He would have
upheld the policy because it served the public interest:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a
school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all- white, or nearly
all-white, faculty. For one of the most important lessons that
the American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic,
cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought
together in our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land.
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher
that color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far more
convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis
during the routine, ongoing learning process. s3
In Richmond v. JA. Croson Co." the Supreme Court invalidated a city
ordinance that provided a thirty percent set-aside of contract work to minority
owned subcontractors working on city construction contracts.65 In that case, as
the dissent noted, "for the first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict
scrutiny as its standard of Equal Protection Clause review of race-conscious
remedial measures. 66 Justice Stevens again declined to endorse a particular
standard of review.67
However, in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC68 the Court ruled that strict
scrutiny did not apply to FCC policies giving preference to applications for
new broadcasting stations and licenses which were submitted by minorities.69
The majority held that
benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress--even if those measures are not "remedial" in the
sense of being designed to compensate victims of past
governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally
permissible to the extent that they serve important

62. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Ad.
64. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
65. Id. at 477.
66. Id. at 551 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. at 514 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
68. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
69. Id. at 552.
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governmental objectives within the power of Congress and
are substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
In the dissent, Justices Kennedy and Scalia criticized the majority for adopting
a less clear standard "which until now only Justice Stevens had advanced."'
However, the Court changed its stance by overruling MetroBroadcasting
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.72 The Court held "that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words,
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests. '73 Although the case
was decided in the context of federal government contracting, its broad
language seems to allow for no exceptions. Indeed, lower courts, including the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have cited Adarand with approval in applying
the strict scrutiny standard to cases involving racial classifications in the
educational context.74
Thus, in light of Adarand,the racial balancing clause of South Carolina's
Charter School Act must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored in order to pass constitutional muster.
I.

ANALYSIS
D. CompellingState Interest?

The racial balancing provision of the South Carolina Charter Schools Act
was apparently included to avoid "segregation of students by race. 75
Eliminating past dejure segregation but not de facto segregation 76 may clearly
be a compelling state interest that canjustify the use of race-conscious student
assignment policies by school districts. 7 Nevertheless, the remedy must not
include neighboring districts in which there is not a finding of past de jure
segregation. Furthermore, such a remedy may not be reemployed to reverse

70. Id. at 564-65 (footnote omitted).
dissenting).
71. Id. at 632 (Kennedy, J.,
72. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).

73. Id. at 227.

74. See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123
(4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington City Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
75. 1996 S.C. Acts 447.
76. De facto segregation is "[s]egregation which is inadvertant and without assistance of
school authorities and not caused by any state action, but rather by social, economic and other
determinates." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (7th ed. 1999).
77. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
78. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (indicating that de jure segregation in
a Detroit school district did not justify remedy that involved suburbs without a showing of
"interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation.").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/9
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resegregation by private residential choices, such as "white flight," once a
district has achieved unitary status.79 The remedy is also no longer appropriate

when "the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent
practicable."" ° In fact, a district court may end the remedy in stages once certain
aspects of past de jure segregation are cured.' Indeed, the current trend is
toward the dismantling of desegregation plans. 2
Like many districts in South Carolina,83 Beaufort is already under a
desegregation agreement." Under the agreement, prior approval of the
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights is necessary for new school
facilities.8 5 In Lighthouse, the South Carolina Supreme Court extended this
requirement to approval of charter schools.8 6 Thus, a procedure to police the
possible segregation, if any, of the proposed charter school in Lighthouse is
already in place. Nevertheless, the Act does notprovide exceptions to the racial
balancing requirement for districts already under desegregation remedies. Thus,
the Act's racial balancing provision seems redundant as to these districts. It is
unlikely that this sort of duplicative legislative remedial measure can serve a
compelling state interest.
Another compelling state interest that has been asserted in other
jurisdictions is diversity of the student body. 7 Social scientists, laymen, and
even Congress recognize the various social benefits of culturally and racially
diverse settings in schools.88 The Court's decision in Regents of the University

Dejure segregation is "[s]egregation that is permitted [or mandated] by law."

BLACK'S

LAw DICrIONARY 1362 (7th ed. 1999).

79. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,92 (1995) (stating that Kansas City Schools, in trying
to remedy past de jure segregation, tried to reverse "white flight" in its school system by
improving schools and opening enrollment to students in suburban districts, and the Court found

that "in effect, the District Court has devised a remedy to accomplish indirectly what it lacks the
authority to mandate directly; the interdistrict transfer of students.").
80. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991). On remand, the Lighthouse trial

court dismissed the argument that the racial balancing provision was needed due to past dejure
discrimination. Beaufort County Bd. ofEduc. v. Lighthouse Charter School Committee, No. 97CP-7-794, 7 (S.C. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2000) (Order declaring Charter School Act unconstitutional).
The court stated that "while past discrimination may be a compelling reason to discriminate on
the basis of race, this provision applies regardless of the current status of a school district." Id.
81. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
82. See, eg., Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 57 F. Supp.2d 288
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (ending court-ordered desegregation of Charlotte schools and finding voluntary
racial quotas for a magnet school unconstitutional after district had achieved unitary status).
83. Robinson, supra note 26 (citing attorney for S.C. School Boards Association stating
"82 of South Carolina's 86 districts are under some kind of desegregation order").

84. Lighthouse, 335 S.C. at 237, 516 S.E.2d. at 659 (1999).
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. See infra notes 93-107.
88. Joanna R. Zahler, Lessons in Humanity: Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in
PublicEducation, 40 B.C. L. REV.995 nn.195-258 & 285-342 (1999).
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of Californiav. Bakke89 is at the center of controversy regarding whether
diversity may be a compelling interest.9" In that case, only Justice Powell
opined that diversity "furthers a compelling state interest."'" However, the
majority in Metro Broadcastingreferred to Justice Powell's opinion on the
diversity interest, thus strengthening its precedential value.' Furthermore, in
Wygant the Court did not rule out the possibility that diversity might be a
compelling interest.93 The now controlling Adarand holding, as noted in the
dissent, also did not rule out the possibility of diversity as a compelling interest,
but merely called for the application of strict scrutiny.9"
Not surprisingly, lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's mixed
signals on diversity in various ways. Recently, the Fourth Circuit decided two
cases in which public school student assignment policies used race as a factor
in order to achieve diversity.9" In Tuttle v. Arlington County School Boardthe
district had been under desegregation orders.96 The Tuttle court noted that the
issue of whether diversity may be a compelling interest is "unresolved."97
However, both Tuttle and a later case, Eisenbergv. Montgomery County Public
School, the court left open the compelling interest issue and assumed that
diversity is a compelling interest.98 The court then, in each case, proceeded to
invalidate the race-based policies on the second prong of strict scrutiny, finding
the provisions not narrowly tailored. 99
Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, one may plausibly argue that diversity can
constitute a compelling interest. If a case were to be presented in which the
narrowly tailored prong is satisfied,' the court would need to firmly decide the
diversity issue and could conceivably rule either way.' ' Indeed, in Hopwood

89. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
90. See, e.g., id. at 1013 (questioning whether the diversity rationale of Bakke remains
good law); Philip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors ofMy Death Have Been
Exaggerated: Hopwood 'sErrorin "Discarding"Bakke, 28 J. L. & EDUC.391 (1999).
91. 438 U.S. at 315.
92. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990).
concurring) (diversity as a compelling state
93. 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
interest was not argued in this case).
94. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 257-58 (1995) (Stevens &
dissenting).
Ginsburg, JJ.,
95. Eisenberg ex rel Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir.
1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
96. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 700.
97. Id. at 704-05.
98. See id. at 705; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131.
99. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131.
100. Perhaps, for example, something equivalent to the "race plus" admissions system at
Harvard that Justice Powell has endorsed. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
101. On remand, the Lighthouse trial court found that the primary purpose of the Act's
racial balancing provision was to promote racial diversity and this goal was not a compelling
government interest which would allow "qualified students [to be] turned away due to their race"
depriving them ofa state funded education. Beaufort County Bd. ofEduc. v. Lighthouse Charter
Sch. Comm., No. 97-CP-7-794, at4 (S.C. Cir. Ct. May 8,2000) (Order declaring Charter School

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/9

10

2000

Moore: Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse Charter School C
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

v. Texas,' 2 invalidating a minority preference admissions policy at the
University of Texas School of Law, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Justice

Powell's diversity rationale inBakke was no longer good law." Although that
opinion has been criticized by scholars and some Fifth Circuit judges, the case
continues to be good law in the Fifth Circuit."'
The First Circuit, in Wessman v. Gittins,'sconsidered a diversity interest
in the context ofthe race-based admissions policy ofBoston's prestigious exam
schools.' 6 The School Board attempted to distinguish the setting of public
education from other areas by arguing that "diversity is essential in the modem
learning experience. ' The court did not dispute the good intentions behind
the policy or the societal benefits of diversity.' 8 The court, however, was not
persuaded by mere theoretical and anecdotal evidence, instead indicating that
"we must look beyond the School Committee's recital of the theoretical
benefits of diversity and inquire whether the concrete workings of the Policy
merit constitutional sanction .... In short, the devil is in the details."'0 9 The
Wessman court refrained from deciding whether diversity might ever be a
compelling interest, but decided that the School Committee's policy failed to
satisfy the Bakke standard."10
The stated purpose of the racial balancing provision in South Carolina's
Charter School Act, preventing "segregation of students by race,"' is
consistent with a goal ofdiversity. Indeed, diversity has been equated with "the
opposite of racial isolation.""' 2 Because segregation results in racial isolation,
to avoid segregation is to preserve the diversity already present. In light of
views such as those expressed in Wessman, however, one should be prepared
to present hard evidence regarding the educational value of diversity in order
to assert it as a compelling interest." 3 This aspect of diversity, moreover, is not
even articulated in the Act, nor is it discussed in Lighthouse. Rather, the type

Act unconstitutional).
102. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 944 ("Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has
never represented the view of a majority of the court in Bakke or any other case. Moreover,
subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that non-remedial state interests
will never justify racial classifications.").
104. Daniel & Timken, supra note 90, at 399 n. 47.
105. 160 F.3d 790 (Ist Cir. 1998).
106. Id. at 792.
107. Id. at 797.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 798.
110. Id. at 800.
111. 1996 S.C. Acts 447.
112. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130.
113. 160 F.3d at 797.
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ofdiversity contemplated by the South Carolina legislature was mere avoidance
of segregation."'

E. Narrowly Tailored?
Assuming diversity is a compelling interest, the Act clearly fails the
narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny under controlling case law. The
Fourth Circuit case of Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board"5 clearly
supports such a conclusion. In Tuttle, the Arlington County School Board used
a weighted lottery to make the racial composition of the alternative school
reflect the racial composition of the community." 6 The racial balancing
measure was triggered when the racial composition of the applicant pool
deviated more than fifteen percent from that of the county's student
population."' The court held: "Examining the race/ethnicity factor, we
conclude that even under Bakke it was not narrowly tailored because it relies
upon racial balancing. Such nonremedial racial balancing is
unconstitutional."'"
Arguably, if racial diversity itself is shown to be a compelling goal, then
even a narrowly tailored means must necessarily involve an attempt at racial
balancing. In that sense, perhaps the Tuttle rule should be taken to mean that
strict racial balancing, set-asides, or quotas are facially race-based and thus
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, South Carolina's racial balancing provision for
charter schools is clearly the type of policy invalidated in Tuttle andBakke." 9

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
Arlington

1996 S.C. Acts 447.
195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 702.
Id.
195 F.3d at 705. The court considered five factors in finding that the policy in
County was not narrowly tailored:
(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies; (2) the
planned duration of the policy; (3) the relationship between the
numerical goal and the percentage of minority members in the
relevant population or work force; (4) the flexibility of the
policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal cannot be
met, and (5) theburden of the policy on innocent third parties.
Id. at 706 (quoting Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207,216 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
119. Inits May 8 Order declaring the Act unconstitutional, the Lighthouse trial court stated
that "[e]ven if the court were to concede that diversity is a compelling government interest which
would support racial discrimination, it does not find that the policy is narrowly tailored."
Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm., No. 97-CP-7-794, at 5 (S.C.
Cir. Ct. May 8, 2000) (Order declaring Charter School Act unconstitutional). The trial court
focused on the last four factors discussed in Tuttle as dispositive. As to the second factor
regarding the duration of the policy, the court found that the Act requires the school to meet the
mandated racial percentages perpetually, and thus forces the schools to continually view their
students "strictly on the basis of race." Id. Considering the third factor, the trial court noted that
the area of the school district from which Lighthouse would draw its students was seventy five
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Furthermore, unlike the situations in those cases, a desegregation remedy is
currently in place in most South Carolina school districts, 2 ' including
Beaufort."
An argument exists that the Supreme Court should carve out a special
exception to allow school districts to engage in racial balancing.22 By
recognizing and admitting racial balance as a necessary component of the type

of diversity that is sought, passing the narrowly tailored test should become
easier. Even so, the Act, in its current form, is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. The Act's requirement that attainment of an acceptable racial
composition be demonstrated in the application as a condition to approval is
more burdensome and intrusive than necessary. A wait-and-see approach that
would allow the charter school to have open enrollment at the outset and
correct imbalances only if problems arose, for example, would be more
narrowly tailored.
IV. CONCLUSION

The racial balancing requirement of South Carolina's Charter School Act
is typical of measures that have been attempted in other school districts to
prevent segregation. Itis difficult to imagine any evil purpose for its enactment.
The state merely wants to preserve the diversity that naturally exists in the
districts. It is ironic that strict scrutiny, the same tool that has for so long been
used to protect minority classes from legal discrimination by the majority, is
now used to thwart attempts to institute voluntary solutions to patterns of

percent white, and thus the racial balancing provision has no relationship to the racial make-up
of the pool of students eligible to attend the charter school. Id.
The racial balancing provision failed under the fourth factor because of the rigidity of the
policies necessary to satisfy the requirement. Id. at 6. The court found that the provision "would
result in the entire establishment of a charter school being based on race." Id. Further, to meet
the racial requirement Lighthouse might have "to recruit students from as far as fifty miles away.
This expansion ofthe studentpool would result in overburdensome transportation requirements."
Id. On this point, the court "found it compelling that the Charter School has shown that its
proposed enrollment would be within 10% of the relevant population, if the student pool was
narrowed to an area with a reasonable proximation to the proposed site of the Charter School."
Id.
Finally, regarding the fifth factor, the court found "that the provision is unduly burdensome
on innocent third-parties" because "students are burdened by the racial classifications" in
addition to the transportation burdens discussed in reference to the fourth factor. Id.
120. Robinson, supranote 26.
121. Lighthouse,335 S.C. at 237, 516 S.E.2d. at 659 (1999).
122. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of Race-ConsciousAdmissions Programs in
Public Elementaryand Secondary Schools, 112 HARv. L. REv. 940,957(1999) ("[E]lementary
and secondary education is a context in which the compelling interest in educating students fully
may make such programs necessary.").
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segregation. Although the door is open for the possibility that diversity is a
compelling interest, racial balancing per se is impermissible." 2
For better or worse, the racial balancing requirement is probably not
needed. The Lighthouse court determined that Lighthouse was required to
comply with Beaufort's desegregation agreement and to obtain approval from
the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights.'24 This
holding would be codified under the current bill.'" Authorities supervising
desegregation agreements are not known for being lenient. 26 For example, the
Justice Department has been accused of practically obstructing charter school
development in Louisiana through overzealous enforcement of desegregation
orders.' 27 Thus, the wrongs the Act attempts to proactively prevent are already
adequately curbed by the existing system.
While the Act is plainly unconstitutional in its current form, it is unclear
whether the Senate's version of the bill to amend the Act would be
constitutional. The insertion of legislative findings, advocating diversity as an
important interest and a desire that South Carolina not return to its dual system
of education based on race,'" will not guarantee that any court will find the
racial balancing provision serves a compelling interest. Further, the analysis
does not end with the government's interest. The Senate changes would ease
the rigidity and burden of the racial proportionality requirement, thus making
the Act more narrowly tailored to achieving its purpose. However, whether
these changes are enough remains in doubt.
Clearly, the bill, in its House form, not only narrows the tailoring but, by
removing the racial balancing from the face of the Act,' 2 takes the Act out of
strict scrutiny analysis. Under the House bill, the vast majority of South
Carolina's school districts would remain protected by their respective
desegregation orders. 3 For the few districts not under such orders, these
districts could at least rely on the requirement that charter schools adhere to the
same civil rights standards as regular public schools' and, perhaps, the
"adverse effect" clause' to deal with any segregation that might occur. By
waiting for and documenting any problems as they might actually occur, a
123. See discussionsupra Part III.
124. Lighthouse, 335 S.C. at 237, 516 S.E.2d. at 659.
125. H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., Ist Sess. § 59-40-60(F)(8) (S.C. 2000) (amended May 4,
2000).
126. Lynn Schnailberg,JusticeDept.Accused ofObstructingCharterSchools,EDUC.WK.,
Oct. 20, 1999, at 21.
127. Id.
128. H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2000) (amended April 26, 2000).
129. H.R. 4336, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. § 59-40-50(B)(7) (S.C. 2000) (amended May 4,
2000).
130. Id. at § 59-40-60(F)(8).
131. Id. at § 59-40-50(B)(1).
132. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-40-70(C) (West Supp. 1999). This provision was left intact in
the current bill. H.R. 4336 at § 59-40-50(B)(7).
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school system would be in a much stronger position to survive strict scrutiny
should race-based measures be deemed necessary.
John G. Moore
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